| System | Country | Role | See |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kh-31P | Russia | anti-radiation missile (SEAD) | SEAD & DEAD |
| AGM-88 HARM | US | anti-radiation missile (SEAD/DEAD) | SEAD & DEAD |
| Krasukha-4 | Russia | ground-based jammer (radar/AWACS/satellite) | Electronic Counter Measures, Space & SATCOM EW |
| RB-341V Leer-3 | Russia | communications/GSM jamming via drone | Counter-UAS & drone EW |
| Pole-21 / Zhitel | Russia | GNSS and comms jamming | GNSS and navigation warfare, Counter-UAS & drone EW |
| Shipovnik-Aero | Russia | counter-UAV (jamming + takeover) | Counter-UAS & drone EW, CEMA: cyber & EW |
| EA-18G Growler | US | escort / stand-in jamming | SEAD & DEAD |
| EC-130 Compass Call | US | stand-off communications jamming | SEAD & DEAD |
EW relevance
A threat-reference deck makes the abstract principles concrete: you recognise that an S-400 combines the guidance from Missile Guidance with a chain of radars (Radars broken down by role), that a Verba MANPADS is deliberately flare-resistant (Infrared, Electronic Counter Measures), and that Russian jammers such as Krasukha and Pole-21 embody exactly the EA techniques from Electronic Counter Measures, GNSS and navigation warfare and Space & SATCOM EW. The aim is pattern recognition — not exact specifications, which differ per variant and vary between open sources.