You can jam a satellite link at the satellite — then it affects everyone in its coverage area — or close to the user, and then only that area.
In practiceIn Ukraine, Russian systems such as the Peresvet-M disrupt Starlink terminals around a site: a protected bubble of reportedly some 20 km² (Case study: Russian Starlink jammers (Peresvet-M)), not interference with the whole network. Military satellite links use directed beams and frequency hopping to resist such jamming.
The distinction determines the area of effect — compare the geometry of stand-off vs stand-in jamming (SEAD & DEAD):
- Uplink jamming: you jam the satellite's receiver from the ground. If it works, it affects all users within the footprint of that satellite — a wide effect. The drawback: you need a lot of power to reach a satellite in a distant orbit.
- Downlink jamming: you jam the user's receiver locally. Much easier (the user is close by), but the effect is limited to the area around the jammer.
There is also spoofing/meaconing: falsified or rebroadcast signals — in the spirit of GNSS spoofing (GNSS and navigation warfare), but applied to SATCOM. And dazzling: temporarily blinding an optical reconnaissance satellite with a laser (Laser and military applications, Directed Energy Weapons), so that for a while it records nothing usable.