The SATCOM struggle in Ukraine (A current example and protection) became asymmetric in 2026. At the beginning of February 2026 Starlink was cut off for Russian units, after Ukraine introduced mandatory registration of terminals (through the Diia app). Russia then pursued two routes: its own links — decentralised mesh radio modems on its fixed-wing drones, from the Molniya to the Geran class, and an announced satellite internet of its own (Rassvet) whose roll-out has run into setbacks — and denying Starlink to the opponent.
The best-known means for the latter is the Peresvet-M. According to Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, the system floods the terminal's uplink channel and can deny Starlink over an area of about 20 km²; it is reported to have been deployed in Crimea to protect important sites. Note the geometry from Uplink vs downlink jamming: although it acts on the uplink, the reported effect is local — a protected bubble around a site, not a footprint-wide effect.
A jammer is itself a powerful transmitter — and therefore findable (ESM, EW: Electronic Support Measures) and attackable (the SEAD logic of SEAD & DEAD). Ukraine's 422nd Unmanned Systems Regiment, together with the SBU's Alpha centre, claims to have destroyed a first Starlink jammer on 14 June 2026 and to have contributed to the destruction of at least five such systems since. The commander describes them as cumbersome and vulnerable because of their large power demand; around September 2026 Russia switched from generators to the power grid — after which the regiment attacked a substation that supplied radars, EW equipment and Starlink jammers.
According to the same commander, his unit felt the effect of the jammers only once, and it is still unclear whether Russia will scale them up or whether they are mainly an information operation. The lesson is the same as elsewhere in this course: even a LEO constellation with spot beams and many satellites can be jammed locally, but every jammer pays for it with an electromagnetic — and in this case also a logistical — signature of its own.
Source: Kyiv Independent, 23 Sep. 2026 — RU Mil Tracker. Claims from the Ukrainian side (a party to the conflict), not independently confirmed.